High-power microwave (HPM) sources have
been under investigation for several years as potential
weapons for a variety of combat, sabotage, and terrorist
applications. Due to classification restrictions, details
of this work are relatively unknown outside the military
community and its contractors. A key point to recognize is
the insidious nature of HPM. Due to the gigahertz-band
frequencies (4 to 20 GHz) involved, HPM has the capability
to penetrate not only radio front-ends, but also the most
minute shielding penetrations throughout the equipment. At
sufficiently high levels, as discussed, the potential
exists for significant damage to devices and circuits. For
these reasons, HPM should be of interest to the broad
spectrum of EMC practitioners.
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and High
Powered Microwave (HMP) Weapons offer a significant
capability against electronic equipment susceptible to
damage by transient power surges. This weapon generates a
very short, intense energy pulse producing a transient
surge of thousands of volts that kills semiconductor
devices. The conventional EMP and HMP weapons can disable
non-shielded electronic devices including practically any
modern electronic device within the effective range of the
weapon.
The effectiveness of an EMP device is
determined by the power generated and the characteristic
of the pulse. The shorter pulse wave forms, such as
microwaves, are far more effective against electronic
equipment and more difficult to harden against. Current
efforts focus on converting the energy from an explosive
munitions to supply the electromagnetic pulse. This method
produces significant levels of directionally focused
electromagnetic energy.
Future advances may provide the
compactness needed to weaponize the capability in a bomb
or missile warhead. Currently, the radius of the weapon is
not as great as nuclear EMP effects. Open literature
sources indicate that effective radii of "hundreds of
meters or more" are possible. EMP and HPM devices can
disable a large variety of military or infrastructure
equipment over a relatively broad area. This can be useful
for dispersed targets.
A difficulty is determining the
appropriate level of energy to achieve the desired
effects. This will require detailed knowledge of the
target equipment and the environment (walls, buildings).
The obvious counter-measure is the shielding or hardening
of electronic equipment. Currently, only critical military
equipment is hardened e.g., strategic command and control
systems. Hardening of existing equipment is difficult and
adds significant weight and expense. As a result, a large
variety of commercial and military equipment will be
susceptible to this type of attack.
The US Navy reportedly used a new class
of highly secret, non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse
warheads during the opening hours of the Persian Gulf War
to disrupt and destroy Iraqi electronics systems. The
warheads converted the energy of a conventional explosion
into a pulse of radio energy. The effect of the microwave
attacks on Iraqi air defense and headquarters was
difficult to determine because the effects of the HPM
blasts were obscured by continuous jamming, the use of
stealthy F-117 aircraft, and the destruction of Iraq's
electrical grid. The warheads used during the Gulf War
were experimental warheads, not standard weapons deployed
with fielded forces.
Col. William G. Heckathorn, commander of
the Phillips Research Site and the deputy director of the
Directed Energy Directorate of the Air Force Research
Laboratory, was presented the Legion of Merit medal during
special retirement ceremonies in May 1998. In a citation
accompanying the medal, Col. Heckathorn was praised for
having provided superior vision, leadership, and direct
guidance that resulted in the first high-power microwave
weapon prototypes delivered to the warfighter. The
citation noted that "Col. Heckathorn united all
directed energy development within Army, Navy and Air
Force, which resulted in an efficient, focused,
warfighter-oriented tri-service research program." In
December of 1994 he came to Kirtland to become the
director of the Advanced Weapons and Survivability
Directorate at the Phillips Laboratory. Last year he
became the commander of the Phillips Laboratory while
still acting as the director of the Advanced Weapons and
Survivability Directorate.
As with a conventional munition, a
microwave munition is a "single shot" munition
that has a similar blast and fragmentation radius.
However, while the explosion produces a blast, the primary
mission is to generate the energy that powers the
microwave device. Thus, for a microwave munition, the
primary kill mechanism is the microwave energy, which
greatly increases the radius and the footprint by, in some
cases, several orders of magnitude. For example, a
2000-pound microwave munition will have a minimum radius
of approximately 200 meters, or footprint of approximately
126,000 square meters.
Studies have examined the incorporation
of a high power microwave weapon into the weapons bay of a
conceptual uninhabited combat aerial vehicle. The CONOPS,
electromagnetic compatibility and hardening (to avoid a
self-kill), power requirements and potential power
supplies, and antenna characteristics have been analyzed.
Extensive simulations of potential antennas have been
performed. The simulations examined the influence of the
aircraft structure on the antenna patterns and the levels
of leakage through apertures in the weapons bay. Other
investigations examined issues concerning the
electromagnetic shielding effectiveness of composite
aircraft structures.
Collateral damage from E-bombs is
dependent on the size and design of the specific bomb. An
E-bomb that utilizes explosive power to obtain its
damaging microwaves will result in typical blast and
shrapnel damage. Ideally, an E-Bomb would be designed to
minimize and dissipate most of the mechanical collateral
damage. Human exposure to microwave radiation is hazardous
within several meters of the epicenter. However, there is
a relatively low risk of bodily damage at further
distances.
Any non-military electronics within
range of the E-bomb that have not been protected have a
high probability of being damaged or destroyed. The best
way to defend against E-bomb attack is to destroy the
platform or delivery vehicle in which the E-bomb resides.
Another method of protection is to keep all essential
electronics within an electrically conductive enclosure,
called a Faraday cage. This prevents the damaging
electromagentic field from interacting with vital
equipment. The problem with Faraday cages is that most
vital equipment needs to be in contact with the outside
world. This contact point can allow the electromagentic
field to enter the cage, which ultimately renders the
enclosure useless. There are ways to protect against these
Faraday cage flaws, but the fact remains that this is a
dangerous weakpoint. In most circumstances E-bombs are
categorized as 'non-lethal weapons' because of the minimal
collateral damage they create. The E-bomb's 'non-lethal'
categorization gives military commanders more
politically-friendly options to choose from.
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